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In the context of the current public policy focus on rising food prices and their implications 
for food security, this paper examines two major issues raised: (i) Universalization of the 
public distribution system; and (ii) its implications for procurement and buffer-stocks. This 
paper is based on the recent evidence on the profile of public distribution system, its targeted 
version in particular, household’s reliance on the public distribution system and the open 
market, and its policy implications. The paper concludes that the need of the hour is not 
universalisation of the PDS but a revision of the food security norm, a BPL-friendly PDS and 
its efficient functioning. 
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The threat of agflation that is, rising food prices has received much public and policy 
attention in India as well as the world over in recent weeks.
1 Some political parties in India 
have demanded even universalisation of the public distribution system (PDS). Of course, the 
government seems to be aware of the constraints on such a policy option as evident from the 
agriculture minister who has tried to explain them in terms of the huge procurement and 
buffer stock requirements for the PDS and their adverse implications for food grain prices 
and hence, for the food security of the poor.  
 
1.  Issues 
 
Two broad issues have been raised: (i) A case for universalisation of the PDS; and (ii) its 
implications for procurement and buffer stocks. One is not sure how valid is the case for 
universalisation and whether there is any other issue that more than meets the eye. This is 
because the Government has announced several targeted measures to improve policy 
effectiveness on food security of the poor in particular during the reform era initiated in 1991. 
It has classified the PDS cardholders as between poor, that is, those below the poverty line 
(BPL) and non-poor, that is, those above the poverty line (APL) households to define food 
grain and subsidy benefits by differential pricing and quantity entitlements. It has introduced 
another category by starting the Antyodaya scheme in December 2001 to provide for 25 kg of 
food grains at highly subsidised prices of Rs 2 per kg for wheat and Rs 3 per kg for rice for 
one crore poorest BPL families. Therefore, it would be important to examine the issues in the 
context of the latest available information on the current state of the PDS, which has been the 
subject of considerable public focus for reform. 
 
2. Importance of Stable food prices  
 
The importance of an effective policy for stable food grain prices as an instrument in 
ensuring sustained poverty reduction cannot be overemphasized. Empirical studies have 
observed enough evidence to corroborate this proposition. A comprehensive study has shown 
that a 10 % increase in the food grain price in the current year would increase rural poverty 
by 10.6 % in the next year while a 10 % increase in food grain output would reduce rural 
poverty by only 6.2 % in the current year (Bhattacharya et al., 1991; p. 133). Another 
relevant finding in the current context of non-agriculture led growth process is that rural 
poverty would increase by 5.4 % in response to a 10% increase in non-agricultural income. 
The same study has also shown that the government policy of procurement-cum-distribution 
had only marginal impact on poverty.  
 
Because of relative price stability and economic growth since the mid-1990s, we would not 
re-estimate the Bhattacharya et al. (1991) model and verify its policy implications. Moreover, 
as already pointed out, much water has flowed during the reform era in terms of policy 
pronouncements for revamping and improving the targeting effectiveness of the PDS. Hence, 
it would be worthwhile to examine the PDS and its profile across socio-economic groups and 
                                                 
1 The term ‘agflation’ refers to food inflation caused by increases in demand for food resulting from (i) human 
consumption; and (ii) use as a bio fuel.    4
the likely implications for food security in an era of food inflation. We propose to examine 
the findings based on the seventh quinquennial Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted by 
the National Sample Survey (NSS) Organisation of the Government of India during July 
2004-June 2005.  
 
3. PDS Profile 
As per the NSS findings, 81 % of the rural and 67 % of the urban households in the country 
as a whole had ration cards in the year 2004-05. How far was it targeted? As against the 
estimated incidence of rural household poverty of 24.5 %, three per cent of the households in 
rural India possessed the Antyodaya card and hence, benefited as ultra-poor and another 26.5 
% benefited as BPL ration card holders; 52 % of the rural households were ordinary card 
holders while the rest (18.7 %) were without any card. Urban poverty was 25.7 % of the 
households; less than one per cent of the urban households had Antyodaya card, 10.5 % had 
BPL card, 55.6 % had ordinary PDS card and 33.1% had no card (Table 1). Thus, the PDS is 
predominantly rural in terms of absolute as well as percentage number of households 
possessing ration cards.  It benefited majority of the households and virtually universal in the 
sense that more than two-thirds of the households in the urban and four-fifths in the rural 
areas possessed ration cards while the maximum percentage of market dependent households 
for rice/wheat was 92 per cent in rural/urban India (Table 3). 
Table 1: Distribution of households by ration card type, and incidence of household 
poverty: major states (2004/05) 
 
Rural Sector  Urban Sector 
Percentage of households with  Percentage of households with  State 
Antyodaya card BPL card Other card No card
Household 
poverty (%) Antyodaya card BPL card Other card No card
Household
poverty (%)
Andhra Pradesh   2.8  54  16  28  9.61  1.5  26.6  18  54  22.95 
Assam 0.6  12  63  25  19.75  0.2  3.2  40  56  2.79 
Bihar 2.3  15  60  23  38.06  0.8  4.7  42  52  26.46 
Chhattisgarh   4.4  35  32  29  35.61  2.1  15.2  40  43  35.55 
Gujarat 0.8  36  50  13  14.72  0.1  8.4  67  24  11.29 
Haryana 2.6  16  68  13  11.17  1.5  9.9  61  28  10.67 
Jharkhand 3  23  51  23  40.84  0.8  7.5  33  58  15.43 
Karnataka 9.6  42  26  23  17.45  2  14.4  33  51  26.31 
Kerala 1.8  28  57  13  10.83  0.9  19.8  60  19  14.57 
Madhya Pradesh  3.3  31  38  28  33.12  1.9  12.7  43  43  37.04 
Maharashtra 4.4 31  46  19  24.95  0.3 8  67  25  25.49 
Orissa 2  42  23  33  44.97  1.3  11.8  29  58  39.32 
Punjab 0.1  12  76  12  7.65  0  3.9  66  30  4.64 
Rajasthan 2.8  16  78  4  15.34  0.6  2.4  82  15  25.68 
Tamil Nadu  1.5  19  69  11  20.09  0.6  12.8  64  22  19.01 
Uttar Pradesh  2.8  14  65  19  28.58  0.7  7.2  57  36  22.49 
West Bengal  3.2  27  61  8  24.33  0.8  8.8  71  20  9.89 
All-India    2.9  26.5 51.8  18.7 24.5  0.8  10.5 55.6  33.1  20.13 
Note: The term ‘major state’ refers to a state, which had a population of 20 million or more as per the 
2001 Census. 
Source: GoI (2007b; p. 13) and estimates of household poverty were made using the NSS unit record 
data and state- and sector-specific poverty lines published by the Planning Commission (GoI, 2007a)   5
The profile observed for the country as a whole generally held across major states with 
variations around the national average. The states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Orissa 
stood out for high proportion of BPL-card households. Andhra Pradesh had the maximum 
percentage number of BPL-card households (rural: 54 %; urban: 27 %) as against estimated 
rural household poverty of 10% and urban at 30%. Karnataka had BPL-card households of 
42% (rural) and 14.4 % (urban) as against household poverty estimates of 17% (rural) and 
26% (urban). Orissa provided the BPL-card to 42% of rural households and 11.8% of urban 
households as against the estimated poverty ratios of 45 % (rural) and 39 % (urban) (Table 
1).  
As regards the socially vulnerable groups in rural India, 5 % of the Scheduled Tribe (ST), 4.5 
% of the Scheduled Caste (SC), two per cent for other (including Other Backward Castes 
(OBC)) households possessed Antyodaya card. As regards the BPL-card, 40 % of the ST, 35 
% of the SC, 25 % of the OBC and 17 % of the other households were the beneficiaries. In 
sum, three-fourths of the ST and more than four-fifths of the SC, OBC and Other social 
groups possessed ration card in one form or the other (Table 2). 
The urban profile was slightly different: More than one per cent of the SC and ST households 
possessed  Antyodaya card while the percentage was less than one for other groups. The 
percentage number of households holding the BPL card was the highest for the SCs (17 %), 
followed by ST and OBC households (about 14 % each) and Others (5 %). In the urban 
sector, about one-half of the ST and more than two-thirds of each of the SC, OBC and Other 
social groups had access to the PDS outlets (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Distribution of households by ration card type, and incidence of household 
poverty: major social groups – All India (2004/05) 
 
Rural Sector  Urban Sector 
Percentage of households with  Percentage of households with  Social 
group  Antyodaya card BPL card Other card No card
Household 
poverty (%) Antyodaya card BPL card Other card No card
Household
poverty (%)
SC  5.0  39.6  30.8 24.6 43.35  1.3  13.6  37.6 47.5 29.81 
ST  4.4  34.9  43.7 17.0 31.73  1.6  17.3  49.8 31.3 33.12 
OBC  2.3  24.5  54.5 18.7 22.91  0.9  14.4  51.5 33.2 24.22 
Others  1.9  17.3  63.0 17.7 13.01  0.4  5.2  61.8 32.6 12.06 
Total  2.9  26.5  51.8 18.7 24.50  0.8  10.5  55.6 33.1 20.13 
Source: GoI (2007b; p. A-198 & p. A-216) and estimates of household poverty were made using the 
NSS unit record data and state- and sector-specific poverty lines published by the Planning 
Commission (GoI, 2007a) 
4. Reliance on the PDS 
Most important issue that should cause concern is not that of universal coverage but quality 
of food grains sold, availability and transaction costs, which deter the cardholders from 
availing themselves of the PDS. For instance, though 81% of the rural households in the 
country as a whole had ration cards, only 24% reported rice consumption from the PDS and 
only 11% for wheat. As regards urban India, 67% of the households had ration cards but only 
13 % for rice and 11 % for wheat used the PDS (Table 3). The extent of their dependence on 
the PDS for rice and wheat was very limited in sense that on an average a rural / urban   6
household obtained about/less than 10 per cent of its consumption of rice/wheat from the 
PDS (Table 4). In general, the rural and urban households did not rely on the PDS at all. 
Among the major states where the PDS operation is pronounced and significant, the 
following features may be noted: 
 
Table 3: Percentage of households reporting consumption during a 30-day period (in 
2004-05) from PDS and from any source: major states 
 
Percentage of Households Reporting Consumption during a 
30-Day Period 
Rice Wheat 
From PDS  From any source  From PDS  From any source 
State 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Andhra Pradesh   62.2  31.1  96  94  0.6  0.7  27  56 
Assam    9.0 2.3 100 93 0.2 0.3 56  78 
Bihar    1.0 0.7 100 98 1.7 1.5 96  97 
Chhattisgarh    21.7  13.2  99 97 5.3  5.4 31 76 
Gujarat    31.5 7.2  94  94 28.7 6.8  83  91 
Haryana    0.1 0.0 82  92 4.0 5.2 99  98 
Jharkhand    4.4 2.8 99  92 4.3 2.0 71  89 
Karnataka    58.5 21.0  98  91  45.6 14.6  74  81 
Kerala    34.6 23.3  98  93  12.2 12.1  60  72 
Madhya  Pradesh  17.9  8.7 80 93  20.3  10.3  94 98 
Maharashtra    27.5 6.0  93  93 25.8 6.9  86  91 
Orissa    21.5  5.8 98 93 0.2 1.0 36 68 
Punjab    0.1 0.1 74  85 0.3 0.6 100 96 
Rajasthan    0.0 0.2 41 70  12.7  1.9 87 95 
Tamil Nadu   78.9  47.7  97  93  8.9  10.7  29  61 
Uttar  Pradesh    5.8 2.1 96  96 5.6 2.6 99  98 
West Bengal   12.8  5.4  99  94  9.0  3.5  61  82 
All-India    24.4  13.1  92 92  11.0  5.8 72 83 
Source: GoI (2007b; p. 18)  
•  Though 90 % of the rural and 77 % of the urban households in Tamil Nadu had ration 
cards, 79% of the rural and 48 % of the urban households reported having obtained 
rice from the PDS for their consumption; as regards wheat about 10% of the rural and 
urban households used the PDS also (Table 3). However, the extent of their reliance 
on the PDS was much less: on an average, a rural household obtained only 40% of its 
rice/wheat consumption from the PDS while the urban household got 28% of its rice 
and 23% of its wheat consumption from the PDS (Table 4).  
•  Other states where the PDS played an important role and the proportions of 
households, which reported consumption from the PDS, are as follows: For rice, 
Andhra Pradesh (rural: 62%; urban: 31 %), Karnataka (rural: 59%; urban: 21%) and 
Kerala (rural: 35%; urban: 23%). The estimated percentages of households which 
used the PDS wheat also for consumption and which were pronounce pertain to the 
states of Karnataka (rural: 46%; urban: 15%), Gujarat (rural: 29%), Maharashtra 
(rural: 26%), and Madhya Pradesh (rural:  20%; urban: 10%) (Table 3). In all these   7
states, dependence on the PDS, that is, corresponding percentages of purchases form 
the PDS were generally much less (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Reliance on the PDS: percentage of consumption from the PDS by category of 
households: major states (2004-05) 
 
Rural Sector  Urban Sector 
Rice Wheat Rice Wheat  State 
A&BPL hhs.  All hhs.  A&BPL hhs. All hhs. A&BPL hhs. All hhs.  A &BPL hhs.  All hhs.
Andhra Pradesh   33.74  23.26  5.16  3.16  36.49  14.55  2.78  1.28 
Assam    26.04 3.90  0.48  0.15 30.27 1.74  0.00  0.08 
Bihar    1.75 0.54 5.97 1.08 2.36 0.61 9.33 1.35 
Chhattisgarh    23.33 11.54 30.85 16.19 36.50 10.75 41.67  5.12 
Gujarat    31.36 13.35 41.06 14.81 28.67  3.24  22.98  3.07 
Haryana    0.00  0.03 12.99 2.43  0.00  0.02 29.76 4.69 
Jharkhand    5.55  1.54 17.56 4.07 14.35 1.99 11.18 1.53 
Karnataka    73.61 46.51 83.55 54.38 60.21 18.17 63.73 13.68 
Kerala    42.37 20.18 40.95 26.67 40.39 15.99 47.98 21.74 
Madhya  Pradesh    30.71 15.71 32.12 11.97 29.49  5.05  38.29  7.02 
Maharashtra    48.08 21.25 61.02 26.21 37.97  4.63  43.09  6.83 
Orissa    13.85 7.01  1.96  0.56 15.06 2.94  3.52  0.94 
Punjab    0.53 0.10 1.57 0.22 0.00 0.38 0.69 0.60 
Rajasthan   0.00  0.00  45.26  10.49  1.33  0.16  25.43  1.73 
Tamil  Nadu    51.77 40.37 61.64 40.24 48.90 28.05 51.17 23.38 
Uttar  Pradesh    18.89 3.50 12.56 2.29 15.71 1.84 10.90 1.23 
West Bengal   5.87  2.29  45.67  15.93  7.64  1.87  29.48  3.50 
All-India    27.40 13.16 28.16  7.32  34.95 11.24 28.08  3.82 
Note: A&BPL hhs. = Households with Antyodaya and BPL cards. 
Source: Computed from different tables in GoI (2007b) 
5. Targeting Effectiveness 
The targeted versions of the PDS, in spite of the good intentions, involved errors of both 
omission (of the eligible poor households) (called Type I error in targeting) and excess 
coverage of the ineligible non-poor households (called Type II error) even today.
2 The NSS 
reports size distribution of households across twelve percentile classes of monthly per capita 
consumer expenditure (MPCE) for both rural and urban sectors. The estimates show that the 
poorest four MPCE classes, which accommodated the poorest thirty per cent of the 
population, did not exhaust the set of Antyodaya & BPL cardholders. More than 50 per cent 
of the households in these  MPCE classes did not have the Antyodaya & BPL ration cards 
(Table 5). Households possessing the Antyodaya and the BPL ration cards, though generally 
declining in percentage number, were found across higher percentile classes of expenditure in 
both rural and urban sectors (Table 5).  In rural India, even the richest percentile class 
(consisting of the richest five per cent of the rural population) included households 
possessing the Antyodaya  and the BPL ration cards: Nearly one (0.8) percent had the 
Antyodaya card and about 11 % had the BPL-card. In urban India, at least one-hundredth of 
the richest five per cent had the BPL-card. In other words, there is considerable scope for 
reducing both Type I and Type II errors in the targeted versions of PDS.  
                                                 
2 See Cornia and Stewart (1993) for details regarding errors in targeting.   8
Table 5: Percentage of A&BPL households by MPCE class and their reliance on the 
PDS: All India 
 
Rural Sector  Urban Sector 
% of consumption  
from PDS by 
A&BPL hhs 
% of consumption 
from PDS by 










0-235  48.8  30.27  35.84  0 – 335   33.4  41.94  31.25 
235-270  44.3  27.90  28.43  335 – 395   28.3  38.79  30.61 
270-320  40.8  27.97  29.51  395 – 485   26.4  33.34  32.18 
320-365  38.3  26.95  26.44  485 – 580   19.9  37.04  33.34 
365-410  33.9  26.40  30.39  580 – 675   17.8  35.25  28.67 
410-455  33.1  25.51  28.01  675 – 790   11.6  32.56  22.98 
455-510  31.0  27.91  27.99  790 – 930   10.1  34.28  20.84 
510-580  25.7  27.28  27.65  930 – 1100   6.9  32.35  14.57 
580-690  23.8  28.54  29.27  1100 – 1380   4.1  23.20  22.89 
690-890  19.8  28.13  23.90  1380 – 1880   2.2  26.79  5.22 
890-1155  15.2  27.43  18.07  1880 – 2540   1.5  17.36  8.91 
1155 & more  12.0  21.85  24.03  2540 & more   0.9  25.35  30.27 
 All classes  29.4  27.40  28.16  All classes  11.3  34.95  28.08 
Notes:  (1) % of A&BPL hhs = Percentage of households with Antyodaya and BPL ration cards in 
each expenditure class. (2) It should surprise to find majority of the households with Antyodaya & 
BPL ration cards in the non-poor/richer MPCE classes; the estimated poverty lines for rural and urban 
India for the year 2004-05 are Rs 356.30 and Rs 568.60 respectively (GoI, 2007a). GoI (2007b) 
explains this feature as follows: “It should be mentioned here that the MPCE of a household is based 
on its consumption expenditure during the last 30 days. A poor household that bought a durable good 
during the 30 days prior to the date of survey might conceivably be placed in a higher MPCE class 
than the class in which its usual MPCE lies.” (GoI 2007b, p. 16; Footnote # 3). One is not sure how 
valid could this explanation be since it would mean that majority of the “usually” poor households 
fall in the NSS non-poor expenditure classes. If this were really so, this Table makes a sad 
commentary either on the state of poverty statistics or on the poverty alleviation programmes in India. 
This is because the statement, if valid, would amount to stating that the NSS estimates of consumption 
distribution do not represent the “usual MPCE” and hence, do not make any sense; if the explanation 
were invalid, it would mean how badly implemented are the targeted poverty alleviation programmes 
even after nearly two decades of reform. 
Source: Estimates based on GoI (2007b) 
 
What is important to note is that the extent of dependence on the PDS by the Antyodaya & 
BPL card households is limited and about the same across percentile classes of expenditure 
(as observed in the profile for the country as a whole (Table 5)). While the Antyodaya & BPL 
card households in the poorest five per cent of the rural households obtained 30% of their 
consumption of rice from the PDS, the percentage varied around 27% for Antyodaya & BPL 
beneficiary households falling in the upper expenditure groups.  As regards urban India, the 
dependence on the PDS for rice of the Antyodaya & BPL cardholders varied from 42 % 
among the poorest to 25 % among the richest. As regards wheat, the extent of dependence on 
the PDS varied around 28 % in both rural and urban sectors (Table 5). This would imply that   9
even the Antyodaya & BPL card households depended to a proportionately larger extent on 
the open market and hence, levels as well as stability of open market prices matter to ensure 
food security of the poor. It was only in Karnataka that the PDS met more than three-fourths 
of the rice/wheat consumption of the rural Antyodaya and BPL card households and about 
two-thirds of those of their urban counterparts (Table 4). 
6. Implications and Issues 
What does the discussion so far imply? What are the issues that call for policy attention?  
1)  If by universalisation of the PDS, the emphasis were on access to the PDS as a market 
source for food grains, then the PDS is virtually universal. All the more so in the rural 
sector because a significant proportion of the rural households are cultivator 
households and hence, do not rely on the market for food grains.  
2)  Still only a minor subset of the ration cardholding households depended upon the 
PDS. In general, even the Antyodaya & BPL card households obtained only about 30 
per cent of their food consumption from the PDS. This could be because of either 
inadequate PDS entitlement or reasons like poor quality, high transaction costs, 
inadequate physical access and availability. Hence, more than univesalisation, the 
policy emphasis should be on rendering the PDS quite BPL-friendly by addressing 
these factors, which hamper poor households’ willingness and ability to purchase 
from the PDS. 
3)  If the emphasis were on scrapping the differential pricing scheme on the basis of 
economic criteria and transferring subsidies to everyone, this would not serve any 
public welfare in a society, which has witnessed widening consumption/income 
inequalities during the reform era. Between 1993/94 and 2004/05, the share in 
consumption of the richest 10 % of the population has increased from 23 to 26 % in 
rural India and from 28 to 30 % in urban India. 
4)  In addition, NSS estimates provide evidence of a gradual decline in food grain 
consumption of the richest five/six decile groups by choice and gradual increase in the 
food grain consumption of the remaining (poorest) decile groups till 1999/2000 in 
both rural and urban India (Suryanarayana and Silva, 2005). Over the decades, with 
economic development involving structural and technological changes, levels of 
physical activity and corresponding energy requirement have declined. This could be 
one reason for the observed decline in food grain consumption and calorie intake by 
the upper decile groups of population in rural and urban India. Even the Government 
of India has acknowledged this fact and has called for a review of the Recommended 
Dietary Allowances (RDA) for Indians during the Tenth Five Year Plan (GoI, 2002; 
pp. 324-325). However, nothing much seems to have been done to revise the food 
security norms though several countries the world over have revised their respective 
norms downwards. Hence, the food security norms are still based on RDA worked out 
several decades ago. Hence, estimates of food insecurity based on outdated norms 
would not make much sense.  
5)  Estimates of food insecurity in India are generally made with reference to outdated 
norms worked out during the 1960s/1970s. Estimates of buffer stock, if based on 
similar norms, would be overestimates. And exaggerated estimates of buffer stock 
requirements and their periodic announcements by the Government would only   10
provoke speculative hoardings and escalated food grain price inflation. In other 
words, a review of the RDA for the Indians is the need of the hour and should be 
taken up on priority basis. 
6)  Most important, even assuming that the dated norms are valid today, any relaxation of 
the PDS pricing policy would call for additional procurement of food grains and end 
up virtually mopping up the entire marketed surplus. This will have adverse 
implications for food grain prices in the open market (Suryanarayana, 1995), which is 
the major source food for even the Antyodaya cardholders.  
In sum, the need of the hour is not universalisation of the PDS but a revision of the food 
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